United States v. Bryan Vance Jones: CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS IN
STATUTORY SUPPRESSION REMEDY IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIVACY
I. Introduction
In United States v. Jones,1 the District Court held that the
defendant could not suppress the e-mail messages obtained by
informant in violation of the Title III of the Omnibus Crime and
Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 (“Wiretap Act”)2 as amended
by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").3
The ECPA amended the Wiretap Act to include not only the
prohibition of the intentional interception and disclosure of
oral and wire communications but also electronic communications.
This comment explores the Wiretap Act’s constitutionality
or legitimacy in light of the Fourth Amendment protections.
More specifically, the comment focuses on the injustice created
by a statute that punishes the violator but does not remedy the
harm suffered by the victim.

Further, this comment will address

the suppression remedy’s failure to keep with the times by
excluding electronic communications such as unlawfully obtained
e-mail messages.
While keeping in mind the courts interests in refraining to
act as a super-legislature, this comment will set out reasons
why the court should have looked beyond the plain language of
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the statute and afforded a Constitutional remedy for the
defendant.
The court circumvents the issue of addressing the violation
of the Wiretap Act – “whether the confidential informant
unlawfully intercepted Mr. Jones' private email correspondence
is a complicated factual inquiry that is ultimately irrelevant
to this motion.”4

Instead, the court assumed that the e-mail

correspondence was unlawfully intercepted and focuses on whether
the Wiretap Act provides a suppression remedy.
Although the Wiretap Act prevents interception of illegally
intercepted electronic communication, the court said once the email is intercepted, the defendant must use a suppression remedy
to prevent the e-mail from being allowed in as evidence.5
Consequently, the unlawfully intercepted e-mail messages were
admitted because the statute’s literal language does not cover
the suppression of electronic communications.
The court's focus on the conclusion that “the Wiretap Act's
suppression remedy would be unavailable to Mr. Jones even if the
informant unlawfully intercepted his messages”6 reveals the
court’s failure to look beyond the plain language of the statute
and to the U.S. Constitution.

In Griswold v. Connecticut, “the
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Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution as providing
a fundamental ‘right to privacy’, located within the undefined
‘penumbras’ of the Bill of Rights.”7

While the U.S. Constitution

does not explicitly mention privacy, the protection of privacy
exists as evidenced by the combination of the different
protections afforded by First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments.8

As a result, the notion of “personal liberty

contained in the Bill of Rights guarantees a ‘right to privacy’
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479, 483-85 (1965) (stating that the U.S. Constitution protects
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encompassing both ‘explicit protection against government
intrusion into the home and personal effects.’”9
With these weighty constitutional protections in the
background, rather than focus on the aspect of privacy granted
to the citizen, the court overlooks the constitutional
protections and centers around the absence of an applicable
suppression remedy in the plain language of the Wiretap Act.10
Regardless of whether the electronic communication had been
illegally intercepted, the court denies the defendant a remedy
for violation of his right to privacy.

In its literal reading,

the suppression remedy within the Wiretap Act does not give an
equal remedy to electronic communications as it does to oral or
wire communications.11

As a result, defendant’s motion to

suppress was denied on Fourth Amendment grounds.12
II. Background
The defendant, Mr. Jones, sought to suppress evidence
turned over to the FBI by an informant.13
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The evidence that the
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"implicit protection of autonomy and free choice.”).
10

United States v. Jones, 364 F.Supp.2d 1303 (D.Utah 2005).

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 1305.
4

defendant sought to suppress were his personal e-mail messages
intercepted by the informant.14

Using the information contained

in those e-mail messages, the FBI obtained a warrant to search
the defendant’s computer.15

Hence, the information found during

the warranted search was used against the defendant.16
The defendant invoked the Wiretap Act to show that the email messages that had warranted the search had been obtained in
violation of the Wiretap Act.17

The defendant further argued

that if the e-mail messages had been unlawfully obtained, the
evidence derived from the search warrant should be suppressed.18
To support his claim, the defendant compelled discovery to
reveal the method in which the informant obtained the e-mail
messages.19

But the court denied defendant’s motion to compel

discovery of both the identity of the informant witness and the
means by which the informant accessed defendant’s private email
account.20

Court affirmed the government’s refusal to release

the identity of the informant – “To protect the safety of that
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informant, this court refused to order disclosure of the
information for reasons stated at greater length in the sealed
transcript.”21

Thus, the government protected both the

informant’s identity and the method in which the e-mail messages
were obtained.22
To remedy the lack of information regarding the informant,
this court set out a hypothetical situation:
This court articulated a "hypothetical" containing
the relevant facts to provide Mr. Jones sufficient
basis for presenting his claim about the Wiretap Act.23
According to the hypothetical, Mr. Jones used a
computer at a local public library in order to
access his email account.24 After leaving the library
computer station, Mr. Jones' email account remained
accessible, and a librarian discovered the email
messages in Mr. Jones' account.25 Mr. Jones argues
that these facts constitute a violation of the
Wiretap Act that should lead to the suppression
of evidence.26
Now turning to the issue of whether the e-mail messages
were obtained unlawfully by the informant, the court examined
the history of the Wiretap Act.

With the passage of the ECPA,

Fourth Amendment protections to cyberspace have evolved to

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.
6

include electronic communications.27

While ECPA is far from

policing and guarding the realm of cyberspace, “ECPA's
procedural safeguards concerning stored communications address
the gap left by the unclear application of the Fourth Amendment
to cyberspace.”28

The courts interpretation of the “ECPA's

statutory framework is thus increasingly important to protecting
personal privacy in the digital age.”29

Before the ECPA was

enacted, the Wiretap Act covered only wire (voice) and oral
communications from unlawful interception.30

But Title I of

ECPA, the Wiretap Act, extended the federal wiretap law's
protections to electronic communications.31
The Wiretap Act makes it illegal for anyone to
"intentionally intercept[] ... any wire, oral, or
electronic communication."32 The court looks to
Section 2515 which “provides the sole suppression
remedy for unlawfully intercepted communications.33
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of such
communication and no evidence derived therefrom may
be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
27
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legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would
be in violation of this chapter.”34
While the Wiretap Act was amended to protect the unlawful
interception of electronic communications, in the plain language
of the statute, the court could not find a suppression remedy
for electronic communications already unlawfully intercepted.35
As a result, the defendant attempted to unsuccessfully argue an
abstract “negative implication” theory.36
In essence, Mr. Jones argues that, because § 2517(3)
permits disclosure at a judicial proceeding of the
contents of intercepted electronic communications when
the contents were received by authorized means, the
converse is also true-that is, that electronic
communications not intercepted by authorized means are
necessarily excluded from testimony at a judicial
proceeding.37
Because of the court’s disinclination to repeal rules by
implication, the court rejected defendant’s negative implication
theory and interpreted the statute according to the plain
meaning of the language.38

Another theory the defendant tried to
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argue was the possibility that the informant had obtained the email password “by means of an unlawful wire or oral
interception” and any information “derived therefrom” is
“subject to suppression.”39

Thus, the defendant proposes the

theory that the informant had received the information to access
the e-mail (such as the password to defendant’s e-mail) by oral
or wire communications.40

If this scenario were true, the e-mail

messages, as evidence derived from the unlawfully obtained oral
or wire communications could qualify under the suppression
remedy and be suppressed.41
This theory was unconvincing due to the lack of evidence
and the specific manner in which the informant must have
unlawfully intercepted the wire or oral communication.42

Using

the current definition of wire communications, the government
filed an underseal pleading refuting defendant’s claim that the
e-mail messages were derived from oral or wire communications.43
Further, the defendant’s theory did not avail due to the
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requirement that the oral or wire communications must have been
obtained by some mechanical or other type of device.44
Had the defendant been able to get around the suppression
remedy problem, the defendant could have proposed another theory
under the Stored Communications Act, or SCA.45

However, the

defendant did not have cause to invoke the SCA and instead
attempted to use the Wiretap Act to suppress the unlawfully
obtained e-mail messages.
Consequently, defendant attempts to repeal section 2517 by
negative implication and prove that the informant obtained the
password through oral or wire communications using an electronic
or mechanical device fails.

And the defendant loses the case on

the finding that the suppression remedy does not cover
electronic communications.46
III. Analysis
The formal definition of “wire communications” included
electronic communications and is probative evidence of the
almost identical nature of the two types of communications.47
The fact that electronic communications had been a type of
communication recognized as wire communications is a strong
suggestion that the two are related.
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However, the ECPA recently

revised the definition of “wire communication" to explicitly
exclude electronic communications (instead made a separate
categorical definition for electronic communications):
Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through
the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection ... furnished or operated by any
person engaged in providing or operating such
facilities for the transmission of interstate or
foreign communications or communications affecting
interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes
any electronic storage of such communication.48
Without access to information on how the informant
unlawfully intercepted the e-mail messages, the defendant’s case
was greatly debilitated.

Thus, the mysterious and non-disclosed

nature of the informants’ identity and the situation surrounding
the interception really made an impact as to the available
arguments for the defendant. And the court successfully
established a firm guard around the identity of the informant.
Nevertheless, the court focused on the technical language
of the Wiretap Act and seemed to lose sight of the main purpose
of the Wiretap Act—to protect a citizen’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”49

In the midst of the uncertainty in

cyberspace law and the Fourth Amendment, the court, while
interpreting the law in the area of privacy, must not neglect
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the “reasonable expectation of privacy test” set in Katz v.
United States.50
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the Fourth
Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a search warrant
when monitoring phone calls made from a public telephone booth.51
In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan articulated the
"reasonable expectation of privacy test" for determining whether
the Constitution protects an individual's right to privacy from
intrusion by the government.52

The two-pronged test requires

that (1) an individual "have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy," and (2) "the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as [objectively]
‘reasonable.'"53
IV. Evaluation
As technology develops and e-mail “becomes more commonplace
means of communication,” it is objectively reasonable for the
members of modern-day society to expect that unlawfully obtained
e-mail messages will be barred from being used against them in a
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criminal or civil trial.54

Because of the tremendous

advancements in technology, more and more people are adopting email into their everyday lives.

Therefore, it may be

objectively reasonable for members of society to expect that
their e-mails will be provided the same degree of protection
given to other forms of communications such as wire or oral.
For example, many more people are sending out e-mails on a daily
basis rather than picking up the phone or sending out faxes.
Yet, due to the uncertainty and open nature of cyberspace,
it is undeniable that e-mail is not a very private means of
communication.

Once a person sends out an e-mail, the sender

has risked the possibility that someone other than the intended
recipient may get a hold of the e-mail.

It can also be thought

that the person sending the e-mail has essentially dropped off
his personal communication into public space for public eyes.55
The ability of people to obtain passwords either through
eavesdropping or even through more technologically advance
means, such as hacking, has contributed to the numerous
instances where people’s e-mails have been intercepted by
unintended recipients.

While the unknown and mysterious nature

of cyberspace may give many people a sense of security, in
reality, people are mistaken about the level of security.
54
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ease with which a person’s e-mail may be accessed is evidenced
by looking at your own life where you hear of friends and family
accessing each other’s e-mail accounts.
Consequently, society may be unreasonable in having an
expectation of privacy in their e-mail communications.

Yet,

because e-mail is so commonly used and relied upon by
corporations and individuals, e-mail has become almost a
necessity to everyday life.

The minor differences between e-

mail and regular mail should not prevent the law from bestowing
the same protections to the realm of cyberspace.
Another interesting point that should be raised is the fact
that electronic communications were formally within the
definition of wire communications.

The almost interchangeable

nature of electronic and wire communications should shed some
light on why e-mail should be given the same privacy protections
given to wire or oral communications.

In other words, e-mail

should not be treated any different from wire and oral
communications.
It is highly arguable that the same protections given to
regular mail need to be given to e-mail because people expect
the same protections given to regular mail to be given to email.

The reasons for these expectations are ingrained in the

very nature of e-mail.

The fact that the communication is

electronic and paperless gives e-mail a uniquely private and
protected quality.

E-mail is further protected by that fact
14

that another person may not access your e-mail communication
without a password.

Thus, in reliance of these protections

inherent in e-mail, corporations and individuals alike send out
private communications via e-mail on a daily basis.
While the internet and technology is a confusing and
unsettled area of law, the court must not neglect the goals of
Fourth Amendment privacy protections of “reasonable expectations
of privacy.”56

The open and untouchable nature of the internet

may thwart the court from affording the same privacy protections
to e-mail as it does to mail.
However, regardless of whether a private communication
travels through air or cyberspace, the medium of communication
should not have an impact on the protection of privacy given by
the law.

Just as the transition of the law developed during the

telephone era and other forms of wire devices, the law should
conform to the changing needs of the society.

It is evident

that e-mail is quickly broadening its reach through America.
And people are becoming more and more reliant on e-mail due to
the many beneficial features of e-mail such as speed,
efficiency, and ease of use.

The law should respond to these

technological advances because a citizen’s expectation of
privacy should be the same as to any type of private
communication whether it be electronic, oral, or paper.
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Understandably, this is a controversial issue with strong
argument on both sides of the table and courts must continually
develop case law with the proper backdrop in mind.

As new

issues arise and present difficult problems, the courts ought to
never lose focus on the goal of the Fourth Amendment – to
protect the “reasonable expectation of privacy.”57
A. Reasons to Find a Constitutional Remedy
Before us now is the issue of whether e-mail is secure
enough to support a reasonable expectation of privacy.

For

example, is e-mail secure enough to sustain the attorney-client
privilege and satisfy the attorney's ethical obligation to
preserve client confidences?58
In the unlikely event that someone other than the intended
recipient intercepts e-mail containing a confidential attorneyclient communication, does the communication retain its
privilege?59

Has the attorney breached the ethical duty to

safeguard confidential communications simply by exchanging

57

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV ("Nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ... .").
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sensitive e-mail with a client?60

Should attorney disciplinary

authorities set out regulations governing the acceptable use of
e-mail between attorney and client?61

These are all crucial

questions, an attorney must consider before deciding to rely on
the privacy protections afforded to e-mail before sending out
privileged information.

Just how secure is e-mail?

And what

should society’s expectations be as to the privacy of e-mail?
These difficult questions are not answered in this case but are
nonetheless pivotal in deciding whether the unlawfully
intercepted e-mail messages should have been suppressed under
the U.S. Constitution.
Even if the suppression remedy in the Wiretap Act did not
cover electronic communications, the court should not have
stopped their assessment with the Wiretap Act.

A remedy not

explicitly contained in a statute does not necessarily mean
there is no remedy within the U.S. Constitution.

The court’s

failure to look beyond the plain language of the Wiretap Act’s
suppression remedy unjustly denied the defendant his privacy
protections granted to him within the penumbras of the U.S.
Constitution.62
The court’s desire to give due regard to the legislature by
deferring to the plain language of the statute instead of
60
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reading into the statute its own interpretation is honorable.
Nevertheless, when a particular statute clearly leaves out an
expected protection, the court should not turn a blind eye to
the deficiency in the statute.

It is the courts role to step in

and conduct the proper role of judicial review and serve as an
appropriate check on the legislative and executive branch.
B. Definitional Similarities Between Wire and Electronic
Communications
The similarities between the definition of wire
communications and electronic communications in section 2510
indicate that distinguishing the two types of communication is
redundant.

The almost identical and overlapping nature of wire

and electronic communications make it very difficult for even
the sophisticated reader to clearly delineate where the
differences lie.

The definition of wire communications is:

Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid
of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of
origin and the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by
any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities
for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications
or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.63
The wire communication definition is almost indistinguishable
from the definition of electronic communication.

Compare the

definition of wire communication to the current definition of
electronic communications:
63
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“electronic communication" means any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or
in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce, but does not
include-(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only
paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device
(as defined in section 3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by
a financial institution in a communications system
used for the electronic storage and transfer of
funds;64
The two definitions both have to do with the transfer of
communication by wire.

From comparing the two definitions, one

can infer that certain types of electronic communications are in
essence wire communications because both include transfers by
wire.

So the confusion and difficulty in figuring out when a

transfer by wire is an electronic communication and not wire
communication lies in the technical difference between “aural
transfers” and “transfers.”

The reasoning behind legislature to

make this distinction is unclear.
There may have been some scientific explanation for the
differentiation between an aural transfer and a regular transfer
but to the lay person, the separation seems to only cause
confusion and redundancy.

The definitional similarities

evidence the fact that the two areas of communication are
64

18 U.S.C. 2510(12)(2000).
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closely intertwined and should not be separated.

The fact that

electronic communications transferred over wire are not aural
transfers but simply transfers should not create reason to set
electronic communications apart from wire communications.
Hence, the technical difference between “aural transfers” and
“transfers” should not provide reason for separation.
Both the fact that electronic communications had been once
part of the definition of wire communications and the fact that
the electronic communications had once been under the umbrella
of wire communications suggest the unreasonableness in affording
unequal privacy protections to both types of communication.
C. Punishing the Perpetrator Without Affording a Remedy to
the Victim is Inconsistent
Then the question becomes, what is the purpose behind
punishing the perpetrator but denying the victim an adequate
remedy for the harm suffered.

In this case, the defendant’s e-

mail was unlawfully obtained and used against him.

While the

informant unlawfully obtained the e-mails which led to the
warrant of a search, the defendant had absolutely no remedy.
This seems to open the door for people to hack into other
people’s e-mails and threaten to turn over information using the
protections of police immunity.
Yet the court does not seem concerned with assessing the
informants conduct but rather hiding the entire situation under
a blanket immunity.

Therefore, the defendant is left with a
20

lost cause.

And while the informant could have violated many

protections afforded even within the Wiretap Act, the defendant
does not currently have a remedy to any of the violations.
Although there have been extensive amendments with the
progression of technology and just as much thought put into new
cyberspace law, e-mail is still not given the same protections
as wire or oral communication.
In this current e-mail age, it is impractical and
nonsensical to differentiate between e-mail and other forms of
communication.

While instant messaging and other forms of

electronic communication may not be as widely used as e-mail,
this generation of computer users is quickly incorporating
“chatting” into their daily lives.

And soon instant messaging

may be seen as another form of oral communication and be brought
in the context of privacy.

As instant messaging and other forms

of electronic communication become more secure and prevalent in
society, the court must address in due time and afford the same
privacy protections as needed.

But this issue is not within the

scope of this comment.
V. Conclusion
The possibility that the suppression remedy’s exclusion of
electronic communication may be in conflict with the privacy
protections found within the “penumbras” of the U.S
Constitution.

The courts assessment of society’s reasonable

expectation of privacy in e-mail is an area of law that has been
21

evolving.

But to deny a suppression Remedy and allow unlawfully

obtained e-mails to be used against the victim is intrusion into
the citizen’s constitutionally protected zone of privacy.
Further, this exclusion of electronic communications seems
to be out of line with the heavy reliance on the protection of
privacy in e-mail by corporations and individuals alike.

As the

use of e-mail progresses and area of technology advances, the
courts should closely assess the reasonable expectations of
privacy existing currently in society.
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